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In this study, we investigate the role of myopic loss aversion (MLA) risk preferences 
on pre-harvest grain marketing decisions using a laboratory experiment. Prospect 
theory parameters were estimated to measure MLA. We estimated a power function for 
utility and obtained power estimates indicating linear utility for gains and concave 
utility for losses. We obtained a loss aversion parameter estimate that suggests the 
presence of loss aversion. We found evidence of probability weighting for both gains 
and losses. We classified individuals into three categories based on their MLA status. 
They are no NMLA, MLA, and high loss aversion (HLA). We observed participants’ 
grain marketing behavior using a novel marketing simulation game called Marketing in 
a New Era (MINE). The findings of our study show that MLA does not significantly 
influence pre-harvest grain marketing behavior. However, we found that high loss 
aversion (HLA), significantly impact pre-harvest hedging positively. Specifically, we 
found that subjects with HLA significantly hedged more of their expected yield than 
subjects with no MLA (NMLA). We found evidence that suggests that buying crop 
insurance leads to increased profit. We found no significant difference between risk 
attitude and profit made. 
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Chapter1 
1.0 Introduction 
Grain marketing represents the process of converting bushels into dollars and represents 
a major component of the producer’s net income calculation. Grain marketing exists in 
a complex decision environment due to unknown price, yield fluctuations, and producer 
preferences. The price of grain is unknown and cannot be accurately predicted. On 
average, the price of grain in the spring, for harvest delivery is higher than the realized 
fall price.  (Groskopf and Walters 2017). This provides an incentive for producers who 
are interested in pre-harvest marketing, defined as selling grain before harvest, to 
engage in hedging in the spring.  
A producer pre-selling grain in the spring can hedge against price risk through 
a variety of tools, including privately provided tools such as forward contracting as well 
as publicly provided tools such as participating in crop insurance. Combinations of 
private and publicly available tools are also possible. Each tool comes with costs and 
benefits.  Pre-harvest marketing exposes the producer to the risk of buying back pre-
sold contracts when they produce less than the quantity they hedged. The producer feels 
the disadvantage of hedging when they are short bushels and fall grain prices are higher 
than the hedged price. Participating in crop insurance requires participants to pay 
premiums, increasing production costs.  
While the benefits and costs of tools are useful, it is important to understand the 
set of possible outcomes from engaging in pre-harvest hedging.1 The first possible 
outcome is where the price at harvest is lower than the spring hedged price. In this case, 
the net-income of the producer will be higher as opposed to a producer who did not 
engage in pre-harvest hedging. This outcome might encourage the producer to engage 
                                                            
1 We focus our discussion of outcomes by grouping them on the directional change from the spring price.   
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in hedging in a subsequent year. Another possible outcome of pre-harvest hedging is 
the case of a bad year (for example a drought year that results in low yield) in which 
price at harvest is higher than the spring hedged price and the producer pre-sold quantity 
higher than the actual yield at harvest. In this case, the producer is financially worse off 
over doing nothing as they had to buy back pre-sold contracts at a higher price than 
sold. This second scenario might negatively affect the quantity of grain that the 
producer will be willing to hedge if any at all in the subsequent year. Despite the 
possibility of being worse off by engaging in spring hedging in some years as opposed 
to doing nothing, empirical studies have shown that producers can reduce the variance 
of their annual gross income by engaging in pre-harvest hedging (Zulauf et al. 2001). 
Given the historical marked difference between the value of grain priced in the spring 
for harvest delivery and grain priced at harvest in most years, it makes one question 
why most producers do not engage in pre-harvest hedging. In fact, a survey of producers 
in Kansas, Iowa, and Texas showed that 64% of grain produced is sold through the cash 
market at harvest (Sartwelle et al. 2000). Given the fact that the majority of producers 
do not engage in hedging, it is important to identify the factors driving producers’ 
hedging behavior. 
In this study, we attempt to improve our understanding of producers' pre-harvest 
hedging behavior using a  framework other than expected utility. Empirical studies have 
shown that producers' behavior under risk and uncertainty do not always follow the 
assumptions of expected utility theory (Collins, Musser, and Mason 1991; Rabin 2000; 
Fryza and Mattos 2010). In this study, we examine the producer's pre-harvest hedging 
behavior using myopic loss aversion proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). 
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) is a combination of two behavioral concepts; loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), a concept that 
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implies that people weight losses more heavily than gains (Gneezy and Potters 1997) 
and mental accounting that refers to the method that people use in coding and evaluating 
financial outcomes. A myopic decision-maker is one that frames decisions and 
outcomes narrowly (Thaler et al. 1997), a myopic investor makes choices that favor the 
short-term. Fryza and Mattos (2010) argued that decision-makers weight short term 
outcomes more heavily than long-term. According to Thaler et al. (1997), a myopic 
decision maker evaluates a prospect from a series of investment and then reject the 
entire sequence if he does not like the initial prospect in the series. MLA can make a 
loss-averse investor take an unprofitable market position because of their attitude 
towards loss (Brorsen 2010). 
We are interested in identifying whether MLA can explain the producer’s 
behavior towards pre-harvest hedging.  A producer can be modeled as an investor that 
makes a series of investment decisions and gets feedback on the investment annually. 
Every year a producer is faced with the decision to allocate the portion of their output 
to sell before harvest and the portion to sell at harvest. At the end of the year, the 
outcome of their decision is made known to them; they evaluate the outcome and decide 
for the next year. In this study, we design an economic experiment to evaluate the role 
of MLA in the producer’s grain marketing behavior. An experimental approach is more 
suitable in understanding variability in risk preferences and its influence on grain 
marketing behavior (Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2014). As the experimental 
approach makes it possible to study risk attitude over a wide range of possible 
outcomes. It provides the opportunity to study the producer’s grain marketing behavior 
that cannot be understood from an aggregated market report. 
In a bid to improve producer’s marketing techniques, the first trend in literature 
on grain marketing focused on providing an optimal hedging level (Miller 1986; Berg 
4 
 
1986; Loy and Pieniadz 2009). Most of these studies did not consider risk preferences 
in generating optimal hedging levels. They were more interested in developing 
marketing techniques that reduce price and income risk (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 
1996). Over the last few decades, there have been some works of literature addressing 
the importance of producer’s risk preferences in decision-making. Only a few of these 
studies focused on grain marketing (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Blakeslee 
1997; Cabrini, Irwin,  and Good 2009). Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) used data 
from a survey of producers in the mid-west to study the role of risk preferences in grain 
marketing. They used a subjective approach to measure risk preferences. Blakeslee 
(1997) evaluated the role of risk aversion in optimal grain marketing decisions under 
the expected utility framework using simulated data. Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2009) 
evaluated the role of behavioral biases and loss aversion in recommendations by 
marketing advisory services. They measured loss aversion by comparing the time that 
market advisory experts hold gain positions over loss positions. Our study is uniquely 
different from these other studies because we use an experimental approach to measure 
individual risk preferences and our ability to observe grain marketing behavior. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study linking individual risk preferences to pre-
harvest grain marketing decisions. 
The primary objective of this study is to explore the role of myopic loss aversion 
risk preferences in grain marketing behavior with emphasis on pre-harvest marketing. 
To meet this objective, we designed a three stages experiment. In the first stage, we 
estimated prospect theory parameters following the approach of Abdellaoui et al. 
(2008). The results of stage 1 allow us to measure MLA using the approach presented 
by Langer and Webber (2005). In the second stage of the experiment, we used a novel 
computer marketing simulation game called Marketing in a New Era (MINE). In this 
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stage, the subjects assumed the role of a producer faced with the decision of hedging 
(part or all) their expected yield before harvest or do nothing and make use of the spot 
market. In making this decision, the subjects are faced with yield risk and price 
uncertainty. The third stage of the experiment is a brief survey of the socio-
demographic characteristics of the participants. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 A Review of Grain Marketing Contracts, Yield Risk, and Crop Insurance  
Selling grain is one of the most important financial decisions producers make every 
year. Selling crops before it is produced is one way the producer manages price risk 
(Paul 1985), and this act is called hedging. Hedging exposes the producer to yield risk 
since the crop they are marketing is yet to be produced. There are several pre-harvest 
contracts that a farmer can engage in, they include but not limited to cash forward 
contracts, futures contracts, and options contracts. The futures and options contracts are 
more standardized contracts than the cash forward contract (Paul 1985), although the 
use of options contracts is not common among producers. The cash forward contract 
allows the producer to target and lock in a price for grain to be delivered on a specified 
date in the future. In engaging in forward contracts the producer cannot benefit from an 
unexpected increase in price but they are protected from any form of a price decrease. 
The futures contract is similar to the cash forward contracts, just like the cash forward 
contract the futures contract allows the producer to lock in a price for grain to be 
delivered in the future. The futures market allows contracts to be traded on an exchange 
and the participants do not necessarily have to make delivery, they can offset the 
contract by taking an opposite position in the market. Unlike the cash forward contract, 
the futures contract allows the producer to benefit from an unexpected increase in price 
while at the same time exposing them to basis risk. Basis is the difference between the 
futures price and the cash price, the basis is important to the producer because they 
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eventually use the spot market to deliver their grain. As stated before the grain contracts 
available to producers are not limited to what we have discussed so far. To improve 
grain marketing experience for producers, some grain industries have developed 
different marketing contracts. Hagedorn et al. (2003) summarized different marketing 
contracts which they termed “new generation contracts”. The new generation contracts 
make marketing less complex for producers by generating hedging contracts that are 
automated, some of the contracts are designed using the average of cash or futures 
prices over a period.  When the automated pricing is used for futures contracts, the 
producer will still be exposed to basis risk.  Hedge to arrive is another form of pre-
harvest contract that allows the producer to lock only the futures component of a cash 
forward contract with the option of fixing the basis at a later date.  
Irrespective of the type of contract used at the pre-harvest level, engaging in any 
form of hedging exposes the producer to yield risk. To manage yield risk exposure, the 
producer can buy crop insurance at the beginning of the planting season. Yield 
protection and revenue protection are the two types of crop insurance contracts that the 
producer can purchase. The yield protection covers only yield risk while revenue 
protection covers both price and yield risk. 
Several factors can affect a producer's decision to purchase crop insurance. 
Ginger and Aslihan (2006) studied the factors that influence a producer’s decision to 
purchase an insurance contract. They found that farmers consider the cost of the 
insurance premium and the availability of some discount on the premium when making 
insurance decisions. Ginger and Aslihan (2006) also reported that in making an 
insurance purchase decision, farmers are more concerned about the cost of insurance 
premium than the chance of getting an indemnity in the event of an unprecedented 
disaster. Jin, Wang, and Wang (2018) examined the role of risk attitude in purchasing 
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weather index insurance in rural China. The results of their study indicate that risk 
aversion and farmer’s belief of experiencing loss significantly affect the likelihood of 
purchasing weather index insurance 
2.2  Risk Preferences and Producer’s Decision Making Behavior 
The concept of risk is an important component of most agricultural economic studies 
involving decision making under uncertainty. This is as a result of the nature of 
agricultural production and marketing that requires the farmer to make some decisions 
under risk (Bocqueho, Jacquet and Reynaud 2011). The producer's decision-making 
behavior under risk depends on the level of risk faced and risk preferences. For this 
reason, the producer’s behavior has been extensively studied under expected utility 
theory (Rolfo 1980; SriRamaratnam 1987; Saha, Shumway and Talpaz 1994). Expected 
utility theory assumes that decision-makers are always rational and follow the axioms 
of rational choice (Nicholson and Snyder 2012). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued 
that the expected utility is not a satisfactory model in explaining the behavior of 
decision-makers under risk. They proposed the prospect theory as a substitute model in 
explaining decision making under risk. Utility theory assumes that a decision-maker 
only accept a prospect after integrating utility from the prospect and the utility of their 
asset, the prospect is acceptable only if the utility from the prospect and asset is greater 
than the utility of the asset alone. In other words, the decision-maker does not care about 
gains or losses but rather cares more about the final state of wealth. Another assumption 
of utility theory is that decision-makers use the given objective probability when 
evaluating the outcome of a prospect. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that people 
evaluate outcomes from a prospect as losses and gains rather than the final status of 
wealth as assumed in expected utility. According to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) 
prospect theory, people use some anchor point when defining losses and gains. The 
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anchor point is known as a reference point. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that 
the reference point is neutral and it coincides with the decision maker’s present wealth 
position, this makes the outcome paid by the prospect to be evaluated as gains or losses. 
In contrast to expected utility, prospect theory states that people do not make use of the 
objective probability of a prospect when evaluating the outcome of a prospect. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provided evidence of probability weighting which is a 
violation of expected utility assumption, they found that people underweight large and 
medium probabilities and overweight small probabilities. According to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), people overweight a prospect with certain outcomes over a prospect 
with a risky outcome, they termed this phenomenon as the certainty effect. Certainty 
effect in a gain domain (a prospect that does not include any loss)leads to risk aversion 
while it leads to risk-seeking in a loss domain (a prospect that involves no gain). Risk 
seeking in loss domain is explained by loss aversion, a concept that states that losses 
loom more than gains.  
In summary, prospect theory proposed a value function that explains the 
behavior of the decision-maker under risk. Using the value function the outcome of a 
prospect depends on the reference point, the probability of each outcome in the 
prospect, and the probability weighting function. The value function for gains is 
concave and convex for losses. 
  Prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility has been tested empirically 
by a good number of studies in recent years. Bocqueho, Jacquet, and Reynaud (2013) 
elicited risk preferences under expected utility and prospect theory among French 
producers using data obtained from a field experiment. They elicited risk preferences 
using a variant of Holt and Laury (2002) multiple price list lottery. Bocqueho, Jacquet, 
and Reynaud (2013) found risk-averse behavior in the gain domain among French 
9 
 
producers under expected utility and prospect theory framework. They also found 
evidence of loss aversion among the farmers and reported that farmers were twice 
sensitive to outcomes that involve losses relative to outcomes that involve gains. 
Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) examined the effect of risk attitude and farm 
characteristics on pre-harvest marketing techniques. They found that producers with 
prospect theory preferences were more risking-seeking after experiencing a loss year. 
Franken, Pennings, and Garcia (2009) explored the influence of risk preferences and 
transaction costs on hog producers marketing strategies in Illinois. They found that risk-
averse producers are more likely to use the spot market when selling their product. 
Franken, Pennings, and Garcia (2009) and Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) both 
used survey data and subjective approach to risk preferences. Mattos, Garcia, and 
Pennings (2008) evaluated the influence of loss aversion and probability weighting on 
producers' futures hedging behavior. They used simulated data generated from a 
distribution of Illinois soybean futures and cash price. The result of the study found 
evidence of probability weighting and loss aversion in determining optimal hedging 
level, their results show that loss aversion only had an influence on decision making 
where subject weight probability. Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018) in an attempt to test 
Sandmo (1971) theory, carried out a combination of lab and field experiments. Sandmo 
(1971) showed that risk-averse producers react to price uncertainty by producing less 
than they would produce under price certainty. Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018) found 
a result that was in contrast to Sandmo (1971), they found that participants reacted to 
output price uncertainty by producing more than what they would produce when faced 
with some level of price certainty. The findings of Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018) 
suggest that the behavior of the producer under risk is better explained by prospect 
theory than expected utility. Zhao and Yue (2019) compared risk preferences of 
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producers of commodity crops and producers of specialty crop using a survey data from 
producers in the U.S. They estimated prospect theory parameters using Holt and Laury 
(2002) multiple price list lottery adopted for estimating prospect theory by Tanaka, 
Camerer and, Nguyen (2010). Zhao and Yue (2019) found no statistical difference 
between prospect theory parameters estimated from the two groups of producers.  
In summary, these works of literature provide evidence that suggests that 
prospect theory plays a role in producer's decision making. Most of them estimated 
prospect theory using survey data (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Franken, 
Pennings, and Garcia 2009; Zhao and Yue 2019 ) and a subjective measure of risk 
preferences (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2009). 
Among these studies, only a few (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Mattos, Garcia 
and Pennings 2008, and Bellemare, Lee and Just 2018) studied the grain marketing 
behavior of the producer under prospect theory. Only Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018) 
used an experimental approach to explain producer’s behavior under risk using Holt 
and Laury (2002) approach, they, however, did not estimate prospect theory parameters 
for individual subjects.  
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 2.3  Review of Myopic Loss Aversion 
The term myopic loss aversion (MLA) was first proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
in an attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle. Equity premium puzzle is a term 
used to describe the unusual large difference in returns between stock and bond. It is a 
puzzle because of the high level of risk aversion that is required for an investor to invest 
in bonds over stocks (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Stock is a more risky investment 
relative to bond, according to Mehra and Prescott (1985), it will require a relative risk 
aversion of 30 to explain why an investor would choose bonds over stocks. MLA is a 
concept from the “Psychology of decision-making”, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) used 
two concepts to describe MLA. The first concept is loss aversion from (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) which states that losses loom more than gains, the second concept is 
mental accounting, which is a subjective method that people use to code and evaluate 
outcomes from a financial prospect when making decisions. According to Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995), due to loss aversion, people follow a non-neutral rule when doing their 
mental accounting. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) illustrated MLA using a problem posed 
by Samuelson (1963) in which Samuelson asked his colleague about his willingness to 
accept a bet that offers a 50% probability of winning $200 and a 50% probability of 
losing $100. The colleague turns down this bet and was only willing to accept the bet 
if he was given 100 chances at the bet. The colleague's reason for refusing the bet was 
that the loss of $100 would pain him more than the utility of gaining $200. The decision 
by Samuelson’s colleague to reject a single shot at the bet and accepting multiple shots 
at the bet is inconsistent with expected utility.  This illustration implies that a loss-
averse decision-maker will be more willing to invest in a risky venture if they evaluate 
the performance of the outcome less frequently. 
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  Thaler et al. (1997) empirically tested the role of MLA in decision making using 
an experimental approach. They used a between-subject experimental design, in which 
they had a treatment and a control group. In a multi-period game, the subjects were 
tasked with allocating resources between two assets with different risk levels. To test 
for myopia the authors protected the control group from myopia by having them make 
the same investment allocation for several periods with less frequent feedback on the 
outcome of the investment. The treatment group was not protected from myopia and 
were given frequent feedback on investment outcome. Thaler et al. (1997) found that 
the subjects who were protected from myopia invested more in the risky asset than 
subjects who were not protected. Gneezy and Potter (1997) explored the role of 
evaluation period on the acceptance of risky assets using an experimental approach. 
They found that risk aversion increases with an increase in the frequency of evaluating 
outcomes of investment. Haigh and List (2005) tested MLA among professional traders 
and students. They found evidence of MLA among professional traders and students. 
They reported that professional traders exhibited behavior consistent with MLA to a 
greater extent than students. Bellamere et al. (2005) carried out an experimental study 
to find out if evidence of MLA found in previous research were as a result of frequent 
information feedback given to the subjects or as a result of flexibility in the investment 
level. Their research question was different from that of previous studies because 
previous research tested MLA by assuming feedback on investment and flexibility in 
the level of investment equally contributed to MLA. Feedback refers to how often the 
subjects got information on the outcome of their investment while flexibility in 
investment refers to the required period of investment. Bellamere et al. (2005) were 
interested in testing if feedback alone was sufficient to induce MLA. Their results show 
that frequent evaluation of investment is enough to induce MLA even when subjects 
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are required to maintain fixed investment over certain periods. Fellner and Sutter (2009) 
found a result that was in contrast with the findings of Bellamere et al. (2005), they 
found the frequency of evaluation and information feedback to be equally important in 
their role in MLA. 
 Langer and Webber (2005) provided an objective measure of MLA to show 
that it can also lead to an increase in investment level as opposed to the findings of 
previous studies where MLA always leads to a decrease in investment. Langer and 
Webber (2005) posited that MLA can be extended to myopic prospect theory by 
introducing probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity (in the domain of gains 
and losses) to the concept of MLA, where the effect of myopia does not necessarily 
lead to a decrease in investment level. To prove that the presence of MLA does not 
necessarily lead to a decrease in investment level, Langer and Webber (2005) used 
individual prospect theory parameter estimates to calculate the utility from a single shot 
at a bet and the utility from a multiple shot at the same bet. The individual is said to be 
myopic if the sign on the utility of a single shot at the bet is different from the sign on 
the utility from a multiple shot at the bet. Langer and Webber (2005) found that for a 
risky profile that offers a small amount of gain with high probability, MLA led to an 
increase in investment when the subject received feedback frequently. 
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Chapter 3 
   Theoretical Background of the study 
To test the application of MLA in grain marketing, we measure MLA following the 
approach of Langer and Webber (2005). To depict myopic prospect theory, Langer and 
Webber (2005) defined 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋)  as the evaluation of the aggregated distribution of n 
independent draws of lottery X. MLA is said to have an impact on the acceptance of n 
independent draws of lottery X if and only if  𝑆𝑆1(𝑋𝑋) and 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋) have different signs. 
𝑆𝑆1(𝑋𝑋) and 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋) can be estimated by assuming a value function from Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) cumulative prospect theory. The value function is given as; 
𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘
𝛼𝛼(𝑥𝑥) = �𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼                    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝑘𝑘(−𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼)       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 < 0    (1) with k≥1 and 0≤α≤1. k reflects 
loss aversion while α reflects diminishing sensitivity. Lower values of α indicate that 
an individual is risk-averse in the gain domain and risk-seeking in the loss domain. To 
calculate 𝑆𝑆1(𝑋𝑋) and 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛(𝑋𝑋) the parameters of prospect theory (i.e 𝛼𝛼 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘) need to be 
estimated. 
To estimate prospect theory parameters Abdellaoui et al. (2008) defined the 
utility that an individual derives from a prospect by three functions. They are the 
probability weighting function for gain (𝑤𝑤+), the probability weighting function for 
loss (𝑤𝑤−) and the utility function (u). Probability weighting is a concept from prospect 
theory that states that people weight probabilities for gain and losses differently. To 
mathematically express the utility of a  prospect, we have to define a gain prospect, loss 
prospect and mixed prospect. 
The utility of a gain prospect is expressed in prospect theory as 
𝑤𝑤+(𝑝𝑝)(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)) + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)                   (2𝑎𝑎) 
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A gain prospect is denoted as x,p;y, It means that the prospect offers x with a probability 
of p and y with a probability of 1-p where  x≥y≥0 while a loss prospect also denoted as 
(x,p;y)   but implies that x≤y≤0 while a mixed prospect implies that x>0>y.  
The utility of a loss prospect is expressed as  
𝑤𝑤−(𝑝𝑝)(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)) + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)                   (2𝑏𝑏) 
𝑤𝑤+ and 𝑤𝑤− are the probability functions for gains and losses respectively. We can 
interpret equation 2a(2b) as a scenario in which the decision-maker stand a chance of 
gaining (losing) at least u(y) and an additional 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠(𝑝𝑝)(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)) where s = + -. The 
utility of a mixed prospect (x,p;y) is defined as  
 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑤𝑤+(𝑝𝑝)𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑤𝑤−(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)                    (3)   
The expression of equation (3) implies that expected utility is a special case of prospect 
theory, where the probability weighting functions are expressed as 𝑤𝑤+(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑤𝑤−(𝑝𝑝) =
𝑝𝑝. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the probability weighting functions 𝑤𝑤+ 
and 𝑤𝑤− exhibit diminishing sensitivity, this leads to the utility function being concave 
for gains and convex for losses (i.e S-shaped utility function).  
Having expressed the utility of gain (loss) and mixed prospect, we now discuss 
how loss aversion can be measured. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) stated that loss aversion 
can be measured by simultaneously measuring utility for gains and losses. According 
to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion can be defined as a case in which the 
utility for loss (-u(-x)) is greater than the utility for gain (u(x)) for all values of x>0. 
From the definition of loss aversion by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion 
coefficient can be defined as the mean or median of −𝑢𝑢(−𝑥𝑥)
𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥)  over relevant x (Abdellaoui 
et al. 2008). The loss aversion elicitation method of Abdellaoui et al. (2008) consisted 
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of three stages. The first stage elicited utility in the gain domain, the second stage 
elicited utility in the loss domain, and the third stage linked utility in the gain and loss 
domains together. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), observable utility 
comprises of loss aversion coefficient k>0 which reflects that individuals process gains 
and losses differently, and a basic utility u that reflects values of outcomes. The value 
function is represented as 
To elicit utility in the gain domain Abdellaoui et al. (2008) selected a probability pg that 
they kept constant throughout the experiment. They chose a series of gain prospects 
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔;𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) and elicited the certainty equivalents of the chosen series. Following 
equations 1 and 2a, the utility of the certainty equivalent can be represented as ; 
𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿+�𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)� + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)                                      (4) 
Or 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈−1((𝛿𝛿+�𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)� + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖))                                (5) 
Where 𝛿𝛿+ =  𝑤𝑤+(𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔). Equation 5 can be estimated through non-linear least squares by 
adopting a parametric function. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) adopted a power function U(𝑥𝑥) 
= 𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼 We can rewrite equation 5 as 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = (𝛿𝛿+(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼) + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼))1 𝛼𝛼�                     (6)  
where α and 𝛿𝛿+ are parameters to be estimated. The parameter α measures the curvature 
of the utility function while 𝛿𝛿+ measures the impact of the probability weighting. 
To elicit utility on the loss domain Abdellaoui et al. (2008) followed a procedure similar 
to the one described in the gain domain. They selected a series of prospects (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙;𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) 
for which o≥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖>𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,  
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i =1,……..,k, 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 = 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 and elicited their certainty equivalent 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖. 
From equations 1, 2a and 2b we can express 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 as ; 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈−1((𝛿𝛿−�𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)� + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)                                                 (7) 
Equation 7 can be estimated through a non-linear least square method by adopting a 
parametric specification for u. To measure the loss aversion parameter (k) Abdellaoui 
et al. (2008) established a link between utility for gains and utility for losses by eliciting 
a single indifference. A certainty equivalent G* from  within  0 − 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘  is selected, an 
interval from which utility has been estimated in the gain domain. 
L* is determined using  (𝐺𝐺∗, 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔, 𝐿𝐿∗) ⁓ 0. Where ⁓ signify indifference. The utility u(0) 
can be represented as; 
𝛿𝛿+𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺∗) + 𝛿𝛿−𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢(𝐿𝐿∗) = 𝑢𝑢(0) = 0                                                    (8) 
The loss aversion parameter (k) can be easily determined from equation 8 since we 
know 𝛿𝛿+,𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺+), 𝛿𝛿− and 𝑢𝑢(𝐿𝐿∗) from equations 5 and 7 
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   Chapter 4 
 4.0 Methods and Data 
To meet the objectives of this study a laboratory experiment was carried out. We used 
a laboratory experiment because we believe it is the most appropriate method to collect 
data for this study. It allows us to observe the behavior of subjects under different 
market conditions. Laboratory experiment also allows us to change parameters of 
interest and observe the effect of the change on the subject’s behavior (Levitt and List 
2007). We carried out a laboratory experiment using a subject pool made up of 
undergraduate and graduate students from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. We use 
a student pool because this is an exploratory research and we believe that prior research 
on this area does not exist and therefore the use of student population is appropriate. 
We conducted a combination of within and between-subjects treatment. The price 
treatment was a within-subject design, every subject received the same price treatment 
but in different sequence order. We controlled for insurance by having a treatment and 
a control group. We also control for order effect (explained in section 4.2) by using five 
different sequence orders. we collected data from 20 participants in each sequence 
order. Table 1 shows the number of participants that took part in the study. We had a 
balanced number of subjects in the group with an insurance option and without an 
insurance option. 
Table 1 Distribution of Participants by Treatment and Sequence Order 
 Order1 Order2 Order3 Order4 Order5 Total 
Insurance 
Treatment 
20 20 20 20 20 100 
No insurance  20 20 20 20 20 100 
Total 40 40 40 40 40 200 
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4.1 Experimental Design  
To measure myopic loss aversion and its role in grain marketing, we designed a three-
stage experiment. The purpose of the first stage is to measure individual prospect theory 
parameters and elicit MLA. In the second stage of the experiment, we used a 
combination of within-subject and between-subject treatments. Within-subject 
treatment means all subjects received the same treatment, making it possible to examine 
the behavior of the same subjects under different treatments. In our study, we used a 
within-subject design to examine the hedging behavior of the subjects under different 
market conditions. We used a between-subject design to examine the effect of insurance 
on hedging behavior. We randomly divided the subjects into two groups, treatment and 
control groups. The treatment group was exposed to the crop insurance treatment 
option. In summary, all subjects for this study received the same price treatment, 
however, not all subjects received insurance treatment. 
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4.2 Description of Experimental Procedure  
 
Stage 1 
In stage 1 we elicited MLA. To measure MLA we considered two evaluation modes 
(Myopic and non-myopic) of an investment. 𝑆𝑆1 is the myopic view of the investment 
and 𝑆𝑆3 is the non-myopic view of the investment. An individual is said to be myopic if 
𝑆𝑆 1 < 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 > 0.  𝑆𝑆1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆3 were calculated using individual prospect theory 
parameter estimates. 𝑆𝑆1 is the utility obtained from a single shot at Samuelson’s  Lottery 
L (200,05;-100,0.5) and 𝑆𝑆3 is the utility from  three independent shots at lottery L 
($600,0.125; $300,0.375; 0, 0.375; -$300, 0.125).  
We estimated individual prospect theory parameters following the approach of 
Abdellaoui et al. (2008) explained in our theoretical background. To estimate utility in 
the gain and loss domain, we had 6 tasks each. A task is generated from each prospect 
presented in Table 2 by creating a series of iterations. From the series of iterations, we 
obtain a certainty equivalent to that prospect.  An illustration of a series of iterations 
created from prospect 1 in Table 2   (2000,0.5; 0,0.5) is shown in Table 3. The first 
options in the series of iterations are riskless, only the second option is risky. The 
second option is kept constant throughout a particular task. We obtain the first option 
(indifference value) in Table 3 by simply finding the expected value of the 
prospect 2000,0.5; 0,0.5. The certainty equivalent changes as we move from one 
iteration to another. The size of the certainty equivalent increases or decreases based on 
the choice made by the subject. In this illustration (Table 3) we have bolded choices 
made. The size of the change in the certainty equivalent is determined by adding (or 
subtracting) half the change from the previous iteration with a condition that the number 
must be a multiple of 10. When the numbers are not multiples of 10 they are rounded 
21 
 
down. This method gives an interval within which the certainty equivalent value 
(indifference) should lie, the mid-point of this interval is taken as the certainty 
equivalent.  
Table 2 Prospects to determine utility for gains and utility for losses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
|xi| 2000 4000 6000 10000 10000 10000 
|yi| 0 0 0 0 6000 8000 
 
Table 3 An illustration of bisection Method 
Iteration  Offered in the elicitation of Gi 
1 1000 vs (2000,1/2;0) 
2 500 vs (2000,1/2;0) 
3 750 vs (2000,1/2;0) 
4 620 vs (2000,1/2;0) 
5 680 vs (2000,1/2;0) 
6 710 vs (2000,1/2;0) 
Indifference 695 
  
We also had one task to measure loss aversion. Each iteration was presented to 
subjects as a binary choice question in all the tasks. A binary choice approach is used 
because it leads to fewer inconsistencies (Abdellaoui et al. 2008) from the subjects. We 
used 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 = 1/2 for simplicity. The probability value used does not change the value of 
utility estimated (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). The probability was kept constant for all tasks 
in Stage 1. An example of a binary choice question used in our study is presented in 
figure 1 below. 
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Altogether we had 13 tasks in stage 1. The 13 tasks elicited certainty equivalents for 
gains, losses and loss aversion parameter. 
Figure 1An e.xample of a binary  choice question 
 
 
We used a substantial amount to measure utility in our study. A substantial amount was 
used to detect the curvature of the utility (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). According to Wakker 
and Daneffe (1999) cited in Abdellaoui et al. (2008), utility is approximately linear for 
a small amount of money. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) used multiples of £1000 to facilitate 
the tasks for the subjects, we followed the same approach by using multiples of $1000. 
Loss aversion coefficient (k) was determined by selecting the certainty equivalent from 
prospect 6 (G6) and determining the loss amount L* for which the subject is indifferent 
with zero  (G6*,1/2; L*) ⁓ 0.  
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  2.0 STAGE 2 
To test the effect of MLA on grain marketing, subjects were required to participate in 
a marketing simulation game. For this study, we adopted a simplified version of a 
marketing simulation game called Marketing in a New Era (MINE). MINE is a 
marketing simulation game that allows participants to improve their marketing 
knowledge by exposing them to different market conditions.  In MINE, users can play 
the pre-harvest or the post-harvest part of the game. In this study, we used the simplified 
version of MINE that provides a user with the opportunity to engage in only cash 
forward contracts. We did not consider other forms of pre-harvest contracts such as 
futures contracts, basis contracts, hedge to arrive, and options. We used the simplified 
version to accommodate subjects that may not be familiar with grain marketing without 
compromising the objective of the study. We evaluated the role of MLA on grain 
marketing decisions without having to worry about the presence of multiple instruments 
interacting with the MLA variable to influence the grain marketing decision.  In pre-
harvest marketing, the producer has the opportunity of locking prices before harvest. 
Pre-harvest marketing can begin years before the intended date of delivery, stated 
differently pre-harvest marketing can occur several years before the grain is even 
planted. To keep things simple, subjects had the opportunity to hedge once in a year 
and it occurred on April 15th of the year in our experiment. We chose April because it 
is after planting period and historically futures price of grain for an October delivery is 
highest at this time. In each period, subjects had the opportunity of hedging part or all 
of their expected production in the spring (April) if they decide to hedge. Any unhedged 
grain in the spring was sold using the harvest price in October, which is typically the 
harvest period for corn. The cash price we used was made up of futures and basis, 
although the subjects only saw the cash price as a single component.  
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In this study, we used previously experienced actual cash prices and normalized 
the historical prices to current prices without losing the pattern of price movement for 
the year. To normalize the price, we used the current price of grain as the starting price. 
The price at harvest (October) is determined by considering the percentage change 
between the cash price in April 15th for the chosen year and the price on October 15th 
for that same year. For example, if the previous cash price of corn on April 15th for an 
October delivery was 2.71 and the harvest price was 2.27, then the percentage change 
between spring (April) and harvest (October) price is 16%. To normalize the prices in 
this illustration, we use the current spring as the starting price and calculate the harvest 
price as a 16% increase from the spring price. 
  Subjects were given an expected yield that was kept constant for 
everyone throughout the experiment. They were informed that the expected yield is not 
a guarantee that means the actual yield may be higher or lower than the given expected 
yield, stated differently; they are exposed to yield risk. We controlled for the effect of 
the presence of insurance on hedging decisions by having a group with insurance 
purchase options and a group without it. At the beginning of the Stage 2 game, subjects 
in the insurance group were given the option of buying a revenue protection insurance 
at a 75% coverage level. We opted for a coverage level (75%) because it is the most 
commonly purchased coverage level purchased by producers. We kept the coverage 
level fixed because we are only interested in the effect of insurance on hedging but not 
on the effect of insurance coverage levels on hedging. Subjects were told that the 
insurance only covers the futures price component of the cash price, implying exposure 
to basis risk 
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3.0 Price Treatment 
To examine the effect of MLA on pre-harvest grain marketing under different market 
conditions, we used a price treatment depicting the different market conditions that we 
are interested in. The prices came from Nebraska corn cash price for five different years. 
We chose the prices from a combination of normal, steady, and drought years. A normal 
year is one in which cash price in the spring for fall delivery is at least 10% greater than 
the cash price at harvest.  A steady year is one in which the difference between the cash 
price in the spring for fall delivery and the cash price at harvest is less than 10%. A 
drought year is one in which futures price in the spring for fall delivery is at least 10% 
less than the cash price at harvest. We included three normal years, one steady year, 
and one drought year.  We chose to include more normal years than drought and steady 
years because observation of historical futures data shows that there are more normal 
years than any other.  The five years included in our price treatment came from 1993 
(steady year), 1998 (normal year), 2004 (normal year), 2008 (normal year), and 2012 
(a drought year). Prices from each year represent a treatment and a unique marketing 
condition.  
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  4.0 Amount of Bushel available for Hedging 
All subjects were given an expected production output of 131,400 bushels (bu). We 
arrived at this value using an average of 900 acres of farmland and actual production 
history (APH) of 146 bu. We used the APH from non-irrigated corn in Nebraska which 
is 146 bu per acre (900*146 =131,400). The actual yield we used for the experiment 
also came from non-irrigated corn in Nebraska. The actual yield was only made known 
to the subjects at the end of a production year. The subjects were told that if they hedged 
more than their actual production, the money value of the difference between the 
quantity hedged and the actual production would be deducted from their total sales for 
the year in the form of buy-back expenses.  
5.0 Insurance Premium 
Participants in the insurance treatment group were given a choice to buy insurance or 
leave their grain unprotected. We used the insurance premium from USDA. An RP 
coverage of 75% cost the subjects 14.1ECU (Experimental currency units) per acre. An 
indemnity was paid to subjects if their actual revenue calculated using the December 
futures price at harvest was less than the guaranteed revenue. The cost of insurance 
premium was always deducted from the revenue irrespective of a disastrous occurrence 
if the subject purchased insurance. The Guaranteed revenue was calculated using 
February 1st futures price for harvest delivery as follow; Guaranteed revenue = February 
price*0.75*APH*900 
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6.0 Production Costs 
Production cost was included in the simulation game. The cost per bushel was set at 
2.84 ECU per bu, a value obtained using Nebraska crop budgets for  2019 non-irrigated 
corn with soybean rotation (https://cropwatch.unl.edu/budgets). We subtracted the real 
estate opportunity cost from the cost of production on the budget, we did this because 
the land is part of the endowment that the subject received at the start of the experiment. 
The production cost was fixed at  373,176 ECU  (131,400*2.84 = 373,176). The cost 
of production was deducted at the end of each period (year) 
7.0 Timeline 
There were 5 periods (marketing year) with two opportunities to sell grain. The first 
opportunity to sell occurred at the beginning of the year, which is April 15th in this 
study. Any grain left unpriced will be automatically sold by the computer using the 
harvest price in October.  
8.0 Amount of grain sold per transaction 
A standard Futures contract is 5000 bushels per contract, we created cash contracts in 
multiples of 5000bu, and subjects could contract up to 25,000 bu at once. There was no 
limit to the amount of grain that subject could contract in the spring, however, we 
restricted the amount to the expected production  
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Figure 2 Hedging Decision Screen 
 
 
  9.0 Instructions provided to subjects 
This study was conducted remotely using MINE (https://mine.unl.edu/) online. We 
created a PowerPoint presentation of the instructions for the experiment. We used 
screenshots from the actual experiment and animations to effectively convey the 
context of the experiment to the subjects. Subjects received a copy of the presentation 
via email; they were advised to read the instructions before attempting the game. 
Subjects could ask any question through the email provided to them on the instruction 
or through the experimenter’s phone number. A copy of the instruction slides is 
presented in the appendix. We present a summary of the prior information given to the 
subjects in Table 4.  
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Table 4 Information Provided to Subjects 
Information provided Amount Type of information (fixed 
or variable) 
Expected Production 131,400 bu fixed 
Production cost 373,176 ECU fixed 
Insurance premium 14.1 fixed 
Number of periods 5 fixed 
Guaranteed revenue Based on futures price 
in February 
variable 
*Insurance premium was added to production cost when subject 
purchases insurance 
 
  10. Information Feedback provided 
Subjects received feedback on the quantity of their expected production that they have 
hedged to keep them informed and aware of their decisions. The information on 
quantity hedged is provided to subjects in the form of a chart showing the percentage 
of the expected production hedged. The percentage increases as the subject hedge more 
grain within the year. An example of this chart is shown in figure 3. At the end of the 
year, subjects were provided with feedback on earnings, production cost, insurance 
payment, and buyback expenses. The feedback was provided to participants in the form 
of a summary screen, an example of the summary screen is provided in figure 4. 
Subjects received feedback on the quantity of grain sold, the price, and time 
(April or October) at which the grain was sold. The cost of production and insurance 
premium is summed up as fixed expenses in the summary screen. The total sale is 
calculated using spring price (when hedging occurred), harvest price, and insurance 
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payments (if any). The cost of production and buyback expenses (if any) is deducted 
from the total sales. 
Finally, subjects were provided with information on their actual production for 
the year. The amount of grain presold at the start of the year is also provided on this 
screen so that the subjects can compare the amount of grain they hedged against the 
amount they produced. At the end of a period, before the subjects moved to the next 
year, they were provided with information on yearly earnings as well as their progress 
within the game. An illustration of this feedback is presented in figures 4 to 6. 
Figure 3 Feedback on the quantity of grain hedged 
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Figure 4 feedback at the end of the year 
 
Figure 5 Feedback on actual production 
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Figure 6 Feedback on yearly profit and game progress 
 
   11.0 Practice Periods 
To test the understanding of the subjects about the tasks before proceeding into the main 
game we provided a practice period for both stage 1 and stage 2. The practice for stage 
2 started after stage 1 game ended. The practice questions for stage 1 was different from 
the questions that the subjects were asked in the main game. In stage two practice 
sessions, we used a price series that was different from the once used in the main game. 
We made every other information from the main game similar to what we had on the 
practice session. 
12.0 Experimental Demand Effect 
Experimental demand effect (EDE) is a term used to describe the behavior of subjects 
in an experiment resulting from their perceptions of what constitutes a desired behavior 
in the experiment.  EDE tends to have a stronger impact in a within-subject design 
treatment and it can potentially confound an experiment (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn 
2012). A possible source of EDE that can be of concern in a within-subject treatment 
design is the order effect. 
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The order effect refers to the behavior from experimental subjects resulting from the 
order with which the treatments are presented to the subjects. Order effect is an 
important concern in a within-subject treatment design where subjects participate in 
more than one treatment. A within-subject treatment is appropriate for this study 
because it gives the experimenter the chance to observe the behavior of the same subject 
under different market conditions. The within-subject design provides an internal 
validity that does not rely on random assignment (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn 2012). 
We address the concern for order effects through a counterbalancing technique known 
as Latin square. This method of counterbalancing presents treatments to subjects in a 
manner that each treatment occurs once in each row and each column (Houston 1966). 
Since we have five treatments in this study, we used a 5×5 Latin square arrangement 
presented in Table 5.  With this arrangement, each group of participants received 
different orders of presentation. Using the 5×5 Latin square arrangement we had 5 
groups each for insurance and without insurance treatment. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to groups. 
 
Table 5 Order of treatment presentation 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 
T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 
T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 
T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 
Note: T represent treatment. 
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13 Payment 
Subjects were incentivized for this study using amazon gift cards. Gift cards have been 
used in economic studies as a means of incentivizing experimental subjects (Hafalir 
and Loewenstein 2009; Coopersmith, Bruursema, and Feeney 2016).  Abdellaoui et al. 
(2010) stated that a significant amount of incentive is important in the measurement of 
utility. In their study, the maximum amount of gain at stake was €10,000. They paid all 
subjects participation fee of €10 and randomly picked a participant to play out a gain 
question in which the actual payment was divided by 10. In our study we paid 
participants a $10 participation fee, Unlike Abdellaoui et al. (2010) all subjects were 
given a chance to play out a gain question in stage 1, the maximum amount at stake in 
stage 1 was 10,000 ECU.  We used experimental currency (ECU) to increase incentives 
and reduce experimental costs. To determine payment in stage 1, the computer 
randomly selected a gain question, and payment of the subject depended on the decision 
that they made for that question. For example in figure 1 in section 4.2, if a subject 
chose the riskless option for that question their payment for stage 1 will be 1000 ECU, 
however, if they chose the risky option the computer will randomly select an outcome 
between 2000 ECU and 0 ECU.  
Payment from stage 2 came from the earnings that subjects made from the 5 periods. 
In addition to earnings made from stage 2, we paid a bonus to subjects who earned a 
profit above zero. We paid a bonus to reward good marketing decisions and to keep 
subjects engaged throughout the different market conditions they were exposed to. The 
bonus was 25% of earnings from stage 2, only if the earning is above zero. The total 
amount made by the subjects in the experiment was made known to them at the end of 
the experiment. We used an exchange rate of $1 to 50,000 ECU to convert earnings 
made in the experiment to U.S dollars. The average earning from the study was $14. 
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4.0 Stage 3 
At the end of stage 2, subjects participated in a brief survey. The purpose of the survey 
was to collect data on demographic characteristics of the subjects such as age, school 
level, gender, etc. We also collected data on subjects' familiarity with probability and 
expected value. This is was to test if there is a significant difference between subjects 
who are familiar with the concept as against subjects who are not familiar with the 
concept. Data was also collected on familiarity with grain marketing and farming. 
 4.3 Econometric Model. 
 Our dependent variables are the quantity of grain hedged per year and the profit 
obtained per year. To measure MLA we used prospect theory parameters obtained from 
stage 1 to calculate 𝑆𝑆1   and 𝑆𝑆3. Using Langer and Webber Theoretical framework we 
categorized subjects into three groups based on the sign of 𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆3 
Group 1: subjects with 𝑆𝑆1 > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 > 0  this is the group that will invest in both 
evaluation mode. (No Myopia and No loss aversion) 
Group 2: subjects with 𝑆𝑆1 < 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 > 0 this is the group that will invest only in non-
myopic evaluation mode (MLA) 
Group 3: subjects with 𝑆𝑆1 < 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 < 0 this is the group that will not invest in both 
evaluation mode (HLA). 
To examine the effect of MLA on hedging we used categorical variables for MLA 
groups. We used group 1 (No MLA) as the baseline for comparing the impact of risk 
preferences on hedging (Profit). We controlled for insurance and order effect.  We used 
a dummy variable to control for the effect of insurance on hedging; no insurance option 
was coded 0 while insurance was coded 1. The order effect is the sequence with which 
the treatments were presented to the subjects. We have five price treatment, which 
implies 5 order. We used five dummy variables to represent the order in our regression 
model. We control for subjects’ learning experience within the experiment by using a 
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continuous variable to represent experience. The value for experience variable ranges 
from 1 to 5. We interacted experience with MLA and HLA because estimates from the 
interaction will show the impact of MLA (HLA) that occurred simultaneously with 
experience within the experiment.  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝5
𝑝𝑝=1
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞5
𝑞𝑞=1
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 
   (9) 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable for the ith individual in year t; mla is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when the producer exhibits myopic loss aversion; hla is a dummy 
variable representing high loss aversion equal to 1 when hla is present. Exp is the 
learning experience within the experiment, with values ranging from 1 to 5. mlaExp is 
the interaction term between mla and Exp; hlaExp is the interaction term between hla 
and Exp.  I represent the insurance dummy variable and T is the price treatment 
represented by dummy variables, p ranges from 1 to 5; and the treatment order controls, 
represented by dummy variables with values ranging from 1 to 5.  The constant (𝛽𝛽0) 
represents someone with no mla, and in the no insurance option group. The constant 
also contains the baseline for price treatment and one of the five order effects. We 
estimate two regressions. In the first regression the dependent variable (Yi ) is quantity 
of grain hedged by subject i, in the second regression Yi is the profit made by subject i. 
The independent variables remained the same in both regressions. 
  
37 
 
Chapter 5 
5.0 Results and Implications 
In the following sections, we will present our results on subjects’ prospect theory 
parameter estimates, MLA risk preferences analysis, descriptive statistics on subjects’ 
grain marketing decisions, results on the survey of socio-demographic characteristics, 
and regression results. 
5.1   Analysis of Individual Prospect Theory Parameter Estimates 
As mentioned before, we followed the approach of Abdellaoui et al (2008) in estimating 
prospect theory parameters. We estimated a power function specification for utility. We 
used the estimates from the power function to classify subjects based on the shape of 
their utility for gains and losses. Following Abdellaoui et al (2008) we classify a 
subject’s utility for gain as concave (convex) if the power estimate for gain was less 
(greater) than 1. For losses, an individual is said to have a convex (concave) utility if 
the power estimate for losses is less (greater) than 1. Subjects were also classified into 
three categories based on the choices they made on each prospect presented to them. 
We presented subjects with gains, losses, and mixed prospects. In this study, we used 
6 prospects each for gains and losses, while we used only one question for the mixed 
prospect to elicit loss aversion.  
We classify a subject as risk-averse if their certainty equivalent for a prospect 
was less than the expected value, risk-neutral if the expected value is equal to the 
certainty equivalent, and risk-seeking if the certainty equivalent is greater than the 
expected value. Since we have six prospects each for gains and losses, we classified a 
subject as risk-averse for gains (losses) if at least 4 out of the 6 prospects produced 
certainty equivalents less than the expected values. A subject is risk-seeking if 4 out of 
the 6 prospects produced certainty equivalence greater than the expected values and 
risk-neutral if they produced certainty equivalence values equal to the expected values.  
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We elicited loss aversion parameter by finding the loss amount that establishes an 
indifference between the certainty equivalent of prospect 6 and zero. We classified a 
subject as loss averse if the elicited loss aversion parameter is greater than 1 and gain 
seeking if the loss aversion parameter is less than 1. 
5.2  Risk Attitude Based on Certainty Equivalence 
 
Table 6 shows the certainty equivalents from the prospects used in eliciting utility in 
the gain and loss domain. The median certainty equivalent for both gains and losses 
was fairly similar both reflecting risk-averse behavior. The mean certainty equivalent 
from two loss questions shows a seeking-attitude toward losses. Overall, the results of 
Table 6 show a dominant risk-averse behavior for both gains and losses, however, the 
results of Table 7 show a less proportion of risk-aversion in the loss domain relative to 
the gain domain. The Median certainty equivalents for both gains and losses were fairly 
similar to the findings of Abdellaoui et al (2008). Table 8 shows the result of the 
certainty equivalent for the mixed prospect, the results show a strong risk-aversion for 
the mixed prospect. The amount of loss that subjects were willing to accept was less 
than the corresponding gain. 89% of the subjects were risk-averse for the mixed 
prospect, this proportion was slightly higher than the 80%  that Abdellaoui et al (2008) 
reported in their study. 
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Table 6  Elicited Certainty Equivalents Gains and Losses (Absolute value) 
 Prospect Gains Losses 
 Median Mean Median Mean 
1 915 (695-1030) 906 945(825-1165) 1027 
2 1840 (1375-2085) 1763 1900 (1585-2200) 1979 
3 2845 (2380-3130) 2838 2845 (2468-3345) 3012 
4 4755 (4135-5220) 4665 4755 (4220-5220) 4779 
5 7625 (7625-8375) 7872 7625 (7625-8375) 7846 
6 8960 (8570-9405) 8997 8570 (8570-9405) 8820 
Interquartile ranges are in parenthesis 
Table 7 Classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude 
 losses     
  Risk averse Risk seeking mixed total 
Gains Risk averse 68 45 12 125 
 Risk seeking 30 13 6 49 
 mixed 10 10 6 26 
 total 108 68 24 200 
 
Table 8 Elicited Certainty Equivalents for Mixed Question 
 G* L* 
Median 8960 (8570-9405) 5782 (3935-8510) 
Mean 8997 5789 
Interquartile range in parenthesis 
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5.3 Elicited Utility for gain and Losses 
Table 9 shows the estimated prospect theory utility parameters. Our results show a 
linear utility for gains and concave utility for losses. We obtained a median power 
estimate of 1.01 for gains and 1.18 for losses. The mean power estimate for gains was 
not significantly different from 1 (p = 0.185), the mean power estimate for losses was 
however significantly different from1 (p<0.000). This finding does not strictly conform 
to the supposition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) S-shape utility that implies 
concavity for gains and convexity for losses. The deviation from Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979)  conjecture of S-shape utility could be from the fact that we conducted 
this study during a pandemic when there was a lockdown. Abdellaoui et al (2008) also 
obtained a result that deviated from the S-shape utility reported in Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). They reported concavity in the utility for both gains and losses 
Table 9 Power Estimates and Loss aversion 
 Power estimate gains Power estimate loss Loss 
aversion  
Median 1.01 1.18 1.07 
IQR 0.74-1.30 0.90- 1.53 0.08 -
3.11 
Mean 1.03 1.22 2.46 
 
We classified subjects based on the shape of their utility function for gains and losses 
in Table 10. The results show that 46% of the subjects have a convex utility for gain 
and concave utility for losses. 29% of the subjects have power estimates that follow the 
S-shape utility conjecture proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Overall, we 
observed a 50% concavity for gains and  33% convexity for losses. The dominant utility 
shape for losses was concavity 67%, this proportion is slightly higher than the 59% 
concavity for utility in the loss domain that Abdellaoui et al (2008) reported. Comparing 
the results of  Table 9 with the results from Table 6, it is obvious that the risk aversion 
we observed in the gain domain did not translate to concavity.  This is because there is 
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“no one-to-one” relationship between risk aversion and concavity. (Abdellaoui et al 
(2008) 
The estimate for loss aversion is presented in Table 9. We obtained a mean loss 
aversion parameter of 2.46 which is an indication of the presence of loss aversion 
among the subjects. The value of loss aversion we obtained is fairly similar to the 
median loss aversion reported by Abdellaoui et al (2008). The results of Table 8 shows 
that on the individual level 51% of the subjects were loss averse. 
Table 10 Classification of subjects based on the shape of their utilities 
   losses   
  concave convex Total 
Gain concave 41 59 100 
 convex 93 7 100 
 total 134 66 200 
 
Table 11 Classification of Subjects Based on Loss Aversion Parameter 
Loss aversion 
Category 
Criteria used Number of 
participants per 
category 
percentage 
Loss aversion Subject is loss averse if 
the loss aversion 
parameter is greater than 
1 
102 51 
No loss aversion Subject is said to have no 
loss aversion if the loss 
aversion parameter is less 
than 1 
98 49 
 
 
5.3 Probability Weighting Estimates 
The result of the probability weighting estimates is presented in Table 12, the results 
show evidence of probability underweighting for both gains and losses. The findings of 
Table 9 compares fairly with the findings of Abdellaoui et al (2008). 
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Table 12 Probability weighting Estimates 
 median mean IQR 
W+ 0.47 0.47 0.36-0.57 
W- 0.42 0.44 0.34-0.52 
 
5.4 Analysis of Myopic Loss Aversion Parameter among Subjects 
 
Following the approach of Langer and Webber (2005), we classified subjects based on 
the sign on their utility for S1 and S3. As mentioned before, S1 is the utility from a single 
shot at a lottery that offers a 50% chance of a $200 win and a 50% chance of a $100 
loss. S3 is the utility from the aggregation of three independent shots at the same lottery. 
Using the individual estimates from prospect theory parameters we obtained from stage 
1 we estimated S1 and S3. An individual is said to have MLA if S1<0 and S3 >0, No 
MLA S1>0 and S3 >0 and high loss aversion (HLA) if S1<0 and S3 < 0. Table 13 shows 
the distribution of subjects according to their MLA status. The results show that 37% 
of the subjects had MLA while 59% had no MLA. 
Table 13 Distribution of Subjects according to their MLA status 
MLA category Criteria used for MLA Number of participants 
per category 
Percentage of the sample 
MLA Subjects who would not 
invest in S1 but will 
invest in S3 
74 37 
No mla Subjects who would 
invest in both S1 and S3 
118 59 
High loss aversion Subjects who would not 
invest in S1 and S3 
8 4 
 
5.5 Descriptive Analysis of Subjects’ Grain marketing Decisions 
In this study, subjects were allowed to market grain in five different years. For each 
year, subjects had only two opportunities to sell their grain, the first opportunity was at 
the start of the year (pre-harvest) while the second was at the end of the year (post-
harvest) which was done by the computer. We were interested in observing the quantity 
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of grain that subjects sold at pre-harvest each year and the profit they obtained at the 
end of the marketing year. We were also interested in observing how insurance affects 
hedging behavior, so we controlled for insurance by having an insurance treatment 
group and a control group.  
1 Graphical Relationship between Dependent Variables and 
  Treatment Variables 
 
We present charts showing the average quantity of grain hedged and profits obtained 
by subjects. Figure 7 shows the average quantity of grain hedged by subjects for the 
five price treatments used in this study. Figure 8 shows the average profit obtained from 
the five years. Figures 9 and 10 show the average quantity hedged by insurance 
treatment and control groups. The result shows more hedging among subjects with 
insurance options than subjects in the control group. Figures 11 and 12 show a 
comparison between the profit from the insurance treatment group and profit from the 
control group. The result indicates a higher profit among subjects in the insurance 
treatment group relative to the control group. The results suggest that combining 
hedging and the option to purchase insurance is more profitable than hedging alone. 
As mentioned before, we control for order effect by having 5 different sequence 
order. We controlled for order effect because we believe that the sequence order of 
presenting price treatment to subjects might affect their behavior. Figure 13 shows the 
average hedging by treatment order. The result shows a minimal variation in the 
average hedging between the different sequence orders. We did not observe any 
variation in the average profit made between the sequence orders. Figure 14 shows the 
average profit made by sequence orders. 
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Figure 7 Average Hedging by Year 
 
Figure 8 Average Profit by Year 
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Figure 9 Average Hedging by Year between Insurance and No Insurance Treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Average Hedging Between No Insurance and Insurance Treatment 
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Figure 11 Comparison between Profits from Insurance and No Insurance Option 
 
  
Figure 12 Comparison between Average Profit from No Insurance and Insurance 
Groups 
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Figure 13 Average Hedging by Treatment Sequence Order 
 
  
Figure 14 Average Profit by Sequence Order 
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Next, we present the relationship between our dependent variables and learning 
experience within the experiment. Figure 15 shows the average quantity of grain hedged 
by subjects as they progress within the experiment. The result suggests that as subjects 
progress within the experiment they were willing to take more hedging risk. Figure 16 
shows the average profit obtained as subjects progressed within the experiment 
Figure 15 Relationship between Average Hedging and Experience 
 
  Figure 16 Relationship between Average Profit and Experience 
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  2 Relationship between Risk Preferences and Dependent Variables 
We present average hedging by risk preferences in figure 17. The result shows slightly 
higher hedging among subjects with no MLA relative to subjects with MLA. The group 
with HLA hedged more grain than the group with MLA and no MLA. This result is not 
surprising because HLA is pure loss aversion without myopia. They are not myopic in 
their decision making but places more weight in the occurrence of fall prices going 
below the spring prices they see at the beginning of the year. To avoid a possible drop 
in price, HLA individuals hedge more of their expected yield in the spring. In figure 
18, we present the connection between risk attitude and profit. The result shows a higher 
profit for the group with HLA relative to the two other categories of risk attitude. Figure 
19 shows the average profit of the three categories of risk in a bar chart. 
In figure 20 we connect hedging and experience by risk attitude. The result shows more 
hedging among HLA group as they progressed within the experiment. Figure 21 shows 
profit by risk attitude as subjects progressed in the experiment. Figure 21 reflects the 
findings in figure 20, as we observed more profit among HLA group as they gained 
experience within the experiment. 
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Figure 17 Relationship between Average Hedging by Year and Risk Attitude 
 
  
Figure 18 Relationship between Average Profit and Risk Attitude 
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Figure 19 Average Profit by Risk Attitude 
 
 Figure 20 Relationship between Average Hedging and Experience 
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Figure 21 Relationship between Average Profit and Experience by Risk Attitude 
 
 
5.6 Analysis of Survey Results 
 
We present the results from the survey in Table 14-16. Table 14 shows the results on 
the subject’s perception of their willingness to take risks and knowledge of expected 
value. Table 15 presents the summary of the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
subjects while Table 16 shows the results on subjects’ farming experience and 
familiarity with grain marketing. 
 
Table 14 Results on Subjective Measure of Risk Attitude and Familiarity with 
Expected Value 
Question frequency Percentage of sample 
Willingness to take risk 138 69 
Perceived knowledge of expected 
value 
96 48 
Subjects who correctly answered 
expected value question 
112 56 
Subjects who refused to take a bet 
that offers gain of 200 and loss of 
100 with equal chances of 
occurrence (loss aversion question) 
94 47 
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Table 15   Results on Socio demographic characteristics 
Characteristics Subjects Percentage of the 
sample 
Male 102 51 
Age 
Mean 
Max 
Min 
  
24 
45 
18 
Nationality other than American 124 62 
Undergraduate 126 63 
Subjects that understood the instructions 160 80 
Subjects with no prior experience with 
economic experiment 
127 63.5 
 
Table 16 Results on Experience with Farming and Familiarity with grain marketing 
Question Subjects Percentage of the sample 
Experience from being a farmer 34 17 
Experience from a family member being a farmer 76 38 
Not Familiar with grain marketing 62 31 
Slightly familiar with grain marketing 74 37 
Somewhat familiar with grain marketing 39 19.5 
Moderately familiar with grain marketing 22 11 
Extremely familiar with grain marketing 3 1.5 
Familiarity with commodity marketing 64 32 
 
5.7  Regression Results 
 
The main focus of this study is to examine the effect of MLA on the quantity of grain 
hedged and profit obtained. Our regression model is presented in equation 9. We 
estimated two regressions with the first having quantity hedged as the dependent 
variable and the second having profit as the dependent variable. we estimated a random 
effect model. Insurance was represented using a dummy variable. No insurance (control 
group) was used as a baseline for comparison. We used a categorical variable to 
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examine the effect of MLA on the dependent variable. The group with no MLA was 
the baseline for comparing the effect of MLA and HLA on the dependent variable. We 
interacted MLA and HLA with the experience variable. Experience is the learning 
experience that subject got from progressing within the experiment. We used a 
continuous variable to represent experience. The value for experience ranges from 1 to 
5. 
We present the regression results in Table 17. As the results of the descriptive 
analysis indicated, we did not find any statistically significant difference between the 
hedging from subjects with MLA and subjects with no MLA. We estimated marginal 
effects of  mla and hla, since we interacted both variables with experience. Our results 
indicate a statistically significant impact of HLA on hedging. The results show that 
subjects with HLA hedged more of their expected yield than subjects with no MLA. 
The year dummies included in the regression model were all significant. The year 
dummy variable captures everything that happened within a year that is common among 
all individuals. An important factor that was common among all subjects in this study 
was the price of grain for the year. The statistical significance of the year dummy 
variables is an indication that the hedging from the included years was significantly 
different from the base year (2008). 
We also present the regression for profit in Table 17. The results show a 
negative significant impact of experience on profit.  As we observed in the descriptive 
analysis in section 5.3, the subjects’ willingness to engage in more hedging increased 
as they progressed within the experiment. Due to unpredictable changes in grain price 
every year, the increase in hedging that we observed among subjects as they progressed 
within the experiment did not necessarily transform to higher profit. Results further 
indicate a positive significant relationship between crop insurance and profit. This 
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finding is not surprising as insurance reduces yield and price risk by paying indemnity 
whenever actual yield goes below the actual production history. 
As we observed in the first regression, the year dummy variables were all 
significant in the regression for profit. The finding indicates a significant difference in 
profit between the included year dummy variables and profit from the base year. 
Although HLA variable was significant at 10% level, we did not find a marginal 
statistical significant impact of HLA on profit. 
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Table 17  Regression Results  
 Dependent variable 
 Quantity Hedged Profit 
MLA 5567 
(7777) 
 -8,887 
(9,702) 
HLA 27704 
(17925) 
41,457* 
(24,765) 
EXP 1101 
(1101) 
-4,649** 
(2,120) 
 
MLA_EXP -1737 
(1230) 
3,495 
(2,899) 
HLA_EXP -754 
(5313) 
-10,556 
(7,252) 
Insurance -2486 
(5933) 
11,369*** 
(2,803) 
Order1 -3681 
(9108) 
2,919 
(4,735) 
Order2 9241 
(8884) 
-1,890 
(4,400) 
Order3 2170 
(8887) 
-1,258 
(4,538) 
Order4 4233 
(9481) 
-3,344 
(4,309) 
Year 2012 11072*** 
(3233) 
-127,342*** 
(8,931) 
Year 1998 12806*** 
(3051) 
63,330*** 
(3,989) 
Year 2004 6986*** 
(2850) 
41,094*** 
(4014) 
Year 1993 16735*** 
(2877) 
32,718*** 
(4,818) 
constant 57408*** 
(7810) 
30,249*** 
(8, 143) 
Marginal 
effect 
(MLA) 
356 
(6509) 
 
1599 
(3,045) 
Marginal 
Effect 
(HLA) 
Marginal 
Effect (Exp) 
25441*** 
(7839) 
 
428 
(730) 
 
9790 
(9,370) 
 
-3,779 
(1,710) 
 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 1000 
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 6.0 Conclusion 
The focus of this study was to examine whether myopic loss aversion can explain the 
producer’s pre-harvest grain marketing behavior. To achieve this objective, we 
conducted a laboratory experiment that was made up of three stages. In the first stage, 
we estimated prospect theory parameters to measure MLA. In the second stage, we 
observed the subject’s pre-harvest grain marketing behavior in a simulated market 
environment. In the third stage of the experiment, we collected data on the subject’s 
demographic characteristics, willingness to take risks, and familiarity with commodity 
marketing. 
Estimates from our prospect theory parameters suggest a linear utility for gains 
and concave utility for losses. We obtained a loss aversion parameter estimates that 
indicate the presence of loss aversion. We also found evidence of probability weighting 
in both gain and loss domain. Using our estimates of prospect theory parameters, we 
estimated MLA and found a 37% presence of MLA among our sampled subjects. 
Our regression results indicate that HLA significantly impacts hedging 
decisions. We found no statistically significant evidence that MLA impacts hedging. 
There was no statistically significant difference between the profit made by subjects 
with HLA and subjects with no MLA. We found that experience within the experiment 
negatively impact profit. The results show that insurance positively impacts profit. 
From our results, we can conclude that although HLA significantly impacts grain 
marketing decisions, in the long run, it does not significantly impact profit, While 
purchasing insurance significantly impact profit positively. 
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Appendix 1: Summary Statistics of Grain Marketing Decision By Treatment and 
Sequence Order 
Table15 No Insurance Group Order 1 
Bushels 
Presold 
2012 2008 2004 1998 1993 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 68000 62750 71500 80250 87000 369500 
SD 54517 47751 53830 42286 39749 203992 
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
51.7 47.7 54.4 61.0   
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 3820 74950 86000 64650 34500 263920 
SD 54517 47751 53830 42286 39749 203992 
Max 71820 137700 157500 144900 121500 608420 
Profit       
Mean -
121874 
13695 71715 86454 55796 105786 
SD 89770 58500 64596 29177 8057 124773 
Max -11906 118674 141915 120781 72751 359627 
 
Table 16 No Insurance Group order 2. 
Bushels 
Presold 
2008 2004 1998 1993 2012 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 66000 72250 88000 91000 78000  
SD 47700 46040 44615 45352 52626  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
50.2 54.9 66.9 69.2 59.3  
Bushels sold 
at spot market 
      
Mean 71700 85250 56900 30500 -6180  
SD 47700 46040 44615 45352 52626  
Max 137700 157500 144900 121500 71820  
Profit       
Mean 17816 72615 91801 55051 -
138188 
99095 
SD 58671 55248 30785 8999 86217 86883 
Max 96536 141915 120781 72751 -11906 336726 
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Table 17 No Insurance Group Order 3. 
Bushels 
Presold 
2004 1998 1993 2012 2008 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 76500 89000 89500 83000 59500  
SD 52893 45120 47542 53074 48637  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
58.2 67.7 68.0 63.1 45.2  
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 81000 55900 32000 53074 78200  
SD 52893 45120 47542 53074 48637  
Max 157500 144900 121500 71820 137700  
Profit       
Mean 77715 92491 55032 -
146688 
9821 88370 
SD 63471 31133 9685 87354 59823 90135 
Max 141915 120781 72751 -11906 96536 381377 
 
Table 18 No Insurance Group order 4 
Bushels 
Presold 
1998 1993 2012 2008 2004 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 69750 76000 82000 63750 64250  
SD 48625 51212 44408 49281 50191  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
53 58 62 49 49  
Bushels sold 
at spot market 
      
Mean 75150 45500 -10180 73950 93250  
SD 48625 51212 44408 49281 50191  
Max 144900 121900 71820 137700 157500  
Profit       
Mean 79209 57936 -144006 15048 63015 71202 
SD 3351 10158 73614 60616 60229 79604 
Max 120781 72751 -11906 96536 141915 180542 
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Table 19 No Insurance Group order 5. 
Bushels 
Presold 
1993 2012 2008 2004 1998 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 59250 64250 52000 61000 80000  
SD 48890 43958 54178 47479 42321  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
45.0 48.8 39.5 46.4 60.8  
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 63100 80650 108929 76700 15069  
SD 48890 43958 54178 47479 42321  
Max 121500 144900 157500 137700 71820  
Profit       
Mean 61239 -114343 0.62 59115 86230 92240 
SD 9689 71670 65293 56974 30137 117855 
Max 72751 11906 144424 141915 133560 327509 
 
Table 20 Insurance Group order 1 
Bushels 
Presold 
2012 2008 2004 1998 1993 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 48750 
 
57000 
 
  57750 
 
60500 
 
67000 
 
 
SD 45592 
 
46152 49404 49388 
 
50351 
 
 
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
37 43.3 43.9 46.0 50.9  
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 23070 
 
80700 
 
99750 
 
84400 
 
54500 
 
 
SD 45592 
 
46152 
 
49404 
 
49388 
 
50351 
  
Max 71820 137700 157500 144900 121500  
Profit       
Mean -32776.635 
 
26682 
 
50773 
 
69019 
 
56389 
 
170087 
 
SD 105177.7787 
 
56391 
 
58922 
 
33692 
 
12485 
 
108498 
 
Max 105295.74 132783 141915 120781 72751 385159 
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Table 21 Insurance Group order 2. 
Bushels 
Presold 
2008 2004 1998 1993 2012 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 52250 81000 81250 91500 90000  
SD 49510 52806 48228 48289 50419  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
39 61 61.8 69.6 68.4  
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 86450 76500 63650 30000 18180  
SD 49510 52806 48228 48289 50419  
Max 137700 157500 144900 121500 71820  
Profit       
Mean 17092 79308 83971 50275 -99568 131077 
SD 63056 65582 33149 12594 79222 99640 
Max 132783 165915 120781 72751 27796 351133 
 
Table 22 Insurance Group order 3. 
Bushels 
Presold 
2004 1998 1993 2012 2008 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 54000 72250 69000 70000 69250  
SD 44347 40833 43375 44651 46012  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
41.0 54.9 52.5 53.2 52.7  
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 103500 72650 52500 1820 68450  
SD 44347 40833 43375 44651 46012  
Max 157500 134900 121500 71820 137700  
Profit       
Mean 44370 76492 54360 -59713 36312 151821 
SD 52720 26117 11168 64812 60061 116070 
Max 141915 120781 72751 58796 132783 229372 
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Table 23  Insurance Group 5. 
Bushels 
Presold 
1993 2012 2008 2004 1998 Treatment 
Average 
Mean 82750 79000 78250 71000 73500  
SD 42472 45986 44375 46442 42024  
Percentage of 
expected yield 
hedged 
62.9 60.1 59.5 54.0 55.9  
Bushels sold at 
spot market 
      
Mean 38750 -7180 59450 86500 71400  
SD 42472 45986 44375 46442 42024  
Max 116500 71820 132700 152500 144900  
Profit       
Mean 52162 -86415 45570 67133 77989 156439 
SD 11449 91174 54335 57277 30312 89960 
Max 71801 89796 132783 192414 120781 297744 
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